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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-----STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16875

JAMES (JIM) KOURBELAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

-----------STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of violating§ 58-37-8(1)
(a} (ii) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

This statute

prohibits the distribution of a controlled substance for
value.

The controlled substance sold by appellant was

marijuana.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
guilty on December 19, 1979, in the First District Court,
the Honorable Venoy Christofferson presiding.

Appellant

was sentenced on January 31, 1980, to five years in the Utah
State Prision.

This sentence was stayed and he was placed
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on probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment
rendered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 3, 1979, Appellant was arrested for selling
two pounds of marijuana to Officer Mark Nelson of the Logan
City Police Department (Te 159).

Prior to the actual sale

appellant and Officer Nelson had discussed the sale of
marijuana at Lake Powell and in a series of telephone
conversations.
When' Officer Nelson first approached appellant
about buying some marijuana, appellant said, "sure I'll see
what

I

can do."

Appellant gave Officer Nelson his name,

address, and phone number, asking Officer Nelson to contact
him (T. 128).
Officer Nelson conversed with appellant seven times
by phone from June 30 to July 2, 1979.

Two of the calls were

made by appellant and five were made by Officer Nelson.
During the first conversation appellant indicated
to Officer Nelson that he would sell the marijuana for $525.00
a pound (T. 131).

In addition, appellant suggested that he

could contact his roommate about purchasing some LSD if
Officer Nelson were interested (T. 131, 134).
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During Officer Nelson's second phone conversation
with appellant he discovered that a man named Ladell was
appellant's supplier (T. 137).

At the end of the second

conversation the two decided to consummate the sale at
Sherwood Hills in Cache County (T. 138).
Appellant invited Officer Nelson to call back on
July 1st (T. 138).

When he called, appellant informed

Officer Nelson he could only get two pounds of marijuana,
and he had failed to contact his roommate about the LSD (T. 140).
Later that day appellant called and informed
Officer Nelson he had been unable to contact Ladell,

(T. 142)

and when Officer Nelson called back appellant indicated
he still had not received any word (T. 144).

By July 2nd,

appellant had contacted Ladell and informed Officer Nelson
that he could get two pounds of marijuana (T. 145).

He also.

indicated he would use his boat as callateral to get the
marijuana from Ladell (T. 150).

After finalizing the deal

with Ladell appellant called Officer Nelson to establish
the final details of the transaction (T. 151-154).
Officer Nelson repeatedly testified that appellant
showed no hesitancy in their conversations (T. 129,134,151,
153,157).

When Officer Nelson apologized to appellant for

calling him appellant clearly indicated that he was not
bothered (T. 137).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW ANY
IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT WHICH
ESTABLISHES THE DEFENSE OF
ENTRAPMENT.
Appellant's only contention on appeal is that this
Court should find he was entrapped into the commission of the
offense as a matter of law.
The issue of entrapment was raised in a recent Utah
case, State v. West, No. 15977 (Utah Jan. 14, 1980).

The

West case involved the sale of $25.00 worth of marijuana to
an undercover security officer who inserted himself into the
defendant's social circle, visiting the defendant 12 to 13
times over a nine day period.

The security officer admitted

he asked the defendant "a few times" for drugs while the
defendant claimed he had been constantly hounded for drugs.
This Court in West stated that it would consider
the issue of entrapment by "surveying the evidence and the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the
light favorable to the jury verdict."

Id. at 3.

The Court

went on to say:
Whether entrapment exists is like
any other question of fact. Only where
the evidence is undisputed, or is so
clear and persuasive that reasonable
minds acting fairly thereon would
necessarily so find, could the Court
so rule as a matter of law.
Id. at p . 3-4.
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Entrapment is defined in Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-303

(Supp. 1973):
(1)
It is a defense that the actor
was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the
conunission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording
a person an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), this

Court held that Section 76-2-303 requires the application of
an objective standard.

This standard being "whether the

police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of governmental power."

Id. at 500.

The test used in

assessing police conduct is "whether the law enforcement
official (used)

• • • persuasion or inducement effective to

persuade an average person, other than one who is merely
given the opportunity to commit the offense." Id. at 503.
In applying the test set forth in Taylor it is
appropriate to consider the negotiations between officer
Nelson and appellant leading up to the offense.

The evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, does
not show any impropriety on the part of the police.

Nelson

did not coax, badger, or apply pressure by repeatedly
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requesting appellant to commit the offense.
appeal to appellant's sympathy or exploit a

Nelson did:not
friendsh~p.

Nelson

merely approached appellant about purchasing some marijuana •
.Appellant was open to the suggestion and responded that
he would attempt to get the requested marijuana {T.128).
Weeks later Officer Nelson found appellant was
still interested in making a sale (T.131).

Appellant

agreed to sell marijuana to Officer Nelson in their first
telephone conversation and quoted $525.00 as a reasonable
price for the marijuana he could procure (T.131).
Subsequent calls merely established the details
of the transaction.

Clearly, the evidence shows that Officer

Nelson merely afforded appellant the opportunity to commit
the offense which appellant willingly accepted.
The record does not indicate that appellant was
coerced or induced to act.

Appellant never expressed concern

regarding the illegality of Officer Nelson's suggestion.
Appellant invited Officer Nelson to call him and voluntarily
conducted negotiations preparatory to the actual sale.
Further evidence of appellant's disposition to make the
sale is demonstrated by his willingness to drive to Cache
County to consummate the deal (T.138).

In short, appellant

was self-motivated not coerced into making the sale.
Appellant asserts that United States v. Twigg,
588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1979), supports his allegations that
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the police conduct constituted entrapment.
can be distinguished from the instant case.

However, Twigg
In Twigg

the

Drug Enforcement Agency through the defendant's friend
induced the defendant to set up a laboratory to produce
amphetamine.

The DEA was intricately involved in the

setting up of the laboratory; it purchased most of the
equipment and furnished an isolated farmhouse.

The

defendants did not even know how to produce the drug.
The Court in Twigg did not find the defendants had
been entrapped.

However, it held that the police involvement

in the commission of the offense was so overreaching that
prosecution of the defendant would be a violation of due
process.

The police conduct in the instant case does not

approach the level of involvement that is demonstrated in
Twigg.

Officer Nelson did nothing to facilitate the

procurement of the marijuana.·

He merely offered to buy it.

CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to show that the evidence is
so clear and persuasive that reasonable minds acting upon
it would necessarily find entrapment.

The evidence shows

no dishonorable or unworthy police conduct.

Respondent

asserts that the rulings of the lower court were proper and
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prays the jury verdict be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for\Respondent
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